Brief of \u3ci\u3eAmici Curiae\u3c/i\u3e of 11 Addiction Experts in Support of Appellee by Heyman, Gene M. et al.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
9-2017 
Brief of Amici Curiae of 11 Addiction Experts in Support of 
Appellee 
Gene M. Heyman 
Boston College 
Scott O. Lilienfeld 
Emory University 
Stephen J. Morse 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Sally L. Satel 
American Enterprise Institute 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Behavior and Behavior Mechanisms Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminology and 
Criminal Justice Commons, Law and Psychology Commons, Medical Jurisprudence Commons, 
Neurosciences Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, and the Science and Technology Law 
Commons 
Repository Citation 
Heyman, Gene M.; Lilienfeld, Scott O.; Morse, Stephen J.; and Satel, Sally L., "Brief of Amici Curiae of 11 
Addiction Experts in Support of Appellee" (2017). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1934. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1934 
This Brief is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL 
COURT 
 
 
MIDDLESEX COUNTY                   SJC-12279 
 
 
 
COMMONWEALTH 
 
v. 
 
JULIE ELDRED 
 
 
 
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE OF 11 ADDICTION 
EXPERTS IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEE  
 
Gene M. Heyman, Ph.D. 
Senior Lecturer  
Department of Psychology  
Boston College 
505 McGuinn Hall 
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 (617) 
552-9287 
gene.heyman@bc.edu 
Scott O.  Lilienfeld, Ph.D. 
Samuel Candler Dobbs 
 Professor  
Department of Psychology 
Room 473  
Emory University 
36 Eagle Row 
Atlanta, Georgia 30322 
(404) 727-1125 
slilien@emory.edu 
 
Stephen J. Morse, J.D., Ph.D. 
Ferdinand Wakeman  
 Hubbell  Professor of Law 
Professor of Psychology and 
 Law in Psychiatry  
Associate Director, Center for 
 Neuroscience & Society 
University  of Pennsylvania  
 Law School 
3501 Sansom Street 
Philadelphia,  PA 19104-6204 
(215) 898-2562 
smorse@law.upenn.edu 
Sally L. Satel, M.D. 
Resident Scholar  
American Enterprise 
 Institute  
Lecturer 
 Yale University School of 
Medicine  
1789 Mass Ave NW 
Washington  DC 20036 
(202) 489 6654 
Slsatel@gmail.com 
 
  
 
 i 
 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
May the probationer permissibly be required to 
“remain drug free” as a condition of her probation, and may 
she permissibly be punished for violating that condition, 
where the probationer suffers from substance use disorder 
[SUD], and where her continued use of substances despite 
negative consequences is a symptom of that disorder. 
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 
  Amici curiae are addiction specialists in scholarship, 
practice and law.  The social and legal implications of drug 
addiction have been a central focus of their work, which 
includes numerous important books, articles and public 
presentations on this issue. 
 
Amici believe this case raises important questions 
about principles of behavior, criminal responsibility, and 
the sound and fair administration of criminal justice. Their 
teaching, research and clinical experience on the subject 
have given them a deep appreciation of whether the 
behavior of people who are addicted, including seeking and 
using prohibited substances, is responsive to incentives.  
This case squarely presents this question and hinges on the 
answer to it. We believe that we can provide the Court with 
conceptual, scientific and clinical considerations that 
demonstrate that the brain-disease model of addiction is 
highly contested and, indeed, contradicted by the data.  
These conceptual, scientific and clinical consideration also 
reveal that addicts have the capacity to respond to 
incentives and reasons.  
 
A complete list of amici who reviewed and join in 
this brief is included in the attached Appendix. Amici file 
this brief solely as individuals and not on behalf of any 
institution with which they are affiliated.     
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Amici represent neither party in this action, and offer the 
following views on this matter. 
 
_____________ 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
  This brief is a critique of the brain disease model and 
many supposed implications of that model. It begins with 
a brief history of the model and moves to a discussion of the 
motivations behind the characterization of addiction as a 
“chronic and relapsing brain disease.” We follow with an 
enumeration of fallacious inferences based upon the brain 
disease model, including the very notion that addiction 
becomes a “brain disease” simply because it has 
neurobiological correlates. Regardless of whether addiction 
is labeled a brain disease, the real question, we contend, is 
whether the behavioral manifestations of addiction are 
unresponsive to contingencies.  We then present an 
overview of data demonstrating that addiction is a set of 
behaviors whose course can be altered by foreseeable 
consequences. The same cannot be said of conventional 
brain diseases such as Alzheimer’s or multiple sclerosis. 
The best scientific and clinical data we have do not support 
the view that addicts are unable to refrain from using 
substances by choice. By “choice” we mean the product of 
the capacity to respond to incentive and reasons, which 
obviously varies among addicts but which are virtually 
never entirely lost. Data amply show that addicts retain 
that capacity. Finally, we demonstrate how a decision in 
favor of the probationer could have significant implications 
for the future of treatment-based approaches to criminal 
justice, as well as for criminal responsibility more 
generally. We conclude that the probationer’s claim should 
be denied because it rests on refuted scientific premises 
and will have negative consequences if it is accepted.    
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. THE CHARACTERIZATION OF ADDICTION 
AS A BRAIN DISEASE IS SCIENTIFICALLY, 
CLINCALLY AND CONCEPTUALLY 
CONTESTED 
  
This Part first addresses the origin of the brain 
disease model and is followed by a discussion of its 
rhetorical function.  We show that despite claims that the 
model is “generally accepted,” it is in fact highly contested 
and exceedingly controversial in the scientific community. 
Many eminent scholars reject it, and those who do accept 
it often do so based on reasons extraneous to its validity.  It 
then turns to conceptual confusions inherent in the model, 
flawed analogies of addiction to other, recognized diseases 
and to the process of becoming addicted.  The final section 
demonstrates that adopting a brain disease model of 
addiction does not reduce stigma. Although the 
QUESTION PRESENTED uses the term, substance use 
disorder (SUD), we use the far more common term for the 
phenomenon, “addiction,” throughout this brief. 
 
A. The Origin of the Brain Disease Model 
 
Within the medical and research communities, the 
dominant narrative holds that addiction is a “brain 
disease.” In a seminal article published 20 years ago in 
Science, “Drug Addiction is a Brain Disease, and It 
Matters,” Alan Leshner PhD, then director of the National 
Institute on Drug Abuse, or NIDA, part of the National 
Institutes of Health, proclaimed that addiction was a brain 
disease on the ground that “addiction is tied to changes in 
brain structure and function.” He had previewed the new 
formulation in 1995 to addiction experts, but the exposition 
two years later in Science is considered its official 
introduction to the broad scientific community. The brain-
disease model has since become a staple of medical school 
education and drug counselor training and even appears in 
the antidrug lectures given to high-school students (Koop, 
2007). Rehab patients routinely learn that they have a 
chronic brain disease. And the American Society of 
Addiction Medicine, the largest professional group of 
physicians specializing in drug problems, calls addiction “a 
primary, chronic disease of brain reward, motivation, 
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memory and related circuitry” (American Society of 
Addiction Medicine, 2011). Drug czars under Presidents 
Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama have all 
endorsed the brain-disease framework at one time or 
another (Smith, 2007).  The Surgeon General under 
President Obama endorsed the formulation in a 2016 
report on drug addiction, the first time the Office of 
Surgeon General ever addressed addiction outside of 
nicotine and smoking. The brain-disease model has been 
featured in a major documentary on HBO, discussed on 
talk shows and used in Law and Order, and has been on 
the covers of Time and Newsweek.   The model has become 
dogma. Like all articles of faith, it is often believed without 
question, especially by addiction counselors and other 
clinicians.   (Massing, 2000; Rose & Volkow, 2012; 
Lemonick, 2007; Interlandi, 2008).  
 
Leshner’s successor at the helm of NIDA, 
psychiatrist Nora Volkow, has been a strong proponent of 
the brain disease model. As she explained in an agency 
newsletter, the “brain [of an addicted person] is no longer 
able to produce something needed for our functioning and 
that healthy people take for granted, free will.” According 
to Volkow, the inferior frontal gyrus, part of the brain’s 
frontal lobe (a region that plays a key role in managing 
impulsive actions), serve as a set of “brakes” on drug 
consumption. Addiction disrupts the function of the brakes 
so that “even if I choose to stop,” she told a radio audience, 
“I am not going to be able to;” the brakes can’t perform their 
inhibitory function (Heyman, 2009). 
Before Leshner and his NIDA colleagues designated 
addiction a disease of the brain — meaning that addiction 
is fundamentally a drug-induced disorder of disrupted 
brain function — doctors and much of the public regarded 
addiction as a vague sort of “disease” that manifested as an 
uncontrollable drive to use drugs or alcohol. Leshner coined 
a durable metaphor, writing that drugs “hijack” the brain’s 
motivational and reward circuitry, thereby making the 
signs of addiction, the persistent seeking and using of 
substances, involuntary. “It may start with the voluntary 
act of taking drugs,” he said, “but once you’ve got 
(addiction), you can’t just tell the addict, ‘Stop,’ any more 
than you can tell the smoker ‘Don’t have emphysema”’ 
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(Leshner, 1997).  We explain in a later section why this is 
untrue and why addiction and conventional diseases are 
not analogous. 
We also address the specific meaning of 
“compulsion” in the context of addiction and in relation to 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fifth Edition, of the 
American Psychiatric Association, or DSM-5. In brief, the 
Manual does not even contain the word "compulsion" with 
respect to addiction, nor does it refer to drug taking as an 
"uncontrollable" act. Instead, it sets out criteria for 
"impaired control" and states that a patient might 
manifest impaired control by, among other things, "taking 
more drug than initially intended" and by relapsing. In 
other words, “compulsive” does not mean beyond one’s 
control. Another relevant passage in DSM-5 that we 
subsequently discuss is its “Cautionary Statement for 
Forensic Use,” which warns that the definitions of mental 
disorders it contains were developed to meet the needs of 
clinicians, public health professionals, and researchers but 
“not all of the technical needs of the courts and legal 
professionals” (at p.25).  The statement also notes that a 
diagnosis, even one involving impairments of control, does 
not imply that the person so diagnosed cannot control his 
or her behavior” (id.) 
Let us now consider the neuroscientific data that are 
marshaled in support of the brain-disease model.  First, 
however, it is necessary to insert a caution concerning the 
methodology used in studies of the neurobiological 
underpinning of addiction because those findings apply to 
the work discussed in this and following sections.  Virtually 
all neuroscience of addiction studies use as their subjects, 
addicts who are in treatment for addiction.  This group of 
addicts is therefore not a random, representative sample of 
addicts.  Compared with all addicts, the study population 
is disproportionately diagnosed with other mental 
disorders; in other words, the subjects are “co-morbid” 
(“dually diagnosed”) for addiction and mental illness. This 
means that one cannot reliably know whether any brain 
findings associated with these subjects are accounted for 
by addiction, by the other disorder, or by some combination 
or interaction between the two.  Even findings considered 
by some to be well-established must therefore be evaluated 
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and responded to cautiously.  Although many 
neuroscientists who work on addiction write as if their 
findings disclose a strict causal connection between certain 
brain regions and addictive behavior, virtually all such 
studies indicate only association (correlation) and claims 
about causation are unwarranted. To complicate matters 
further, many brain imaging studies have not been 
replicated (reproduced) and probably could not be (Szucs & 
Ioannides, 2017). This “failure to replicate” is due to 
several factors including small sample sizes, statistical 
under-powering, and spatial uncertainty relating to 
measured regions of interest (ROI) in the brain. These and 
other problems have routinely led to the erroneous 
reporting of weak correlations as much stronger than they 
are (Eklund et al, 2016). 
On the basis of studies with rats and primates, we 
have learned that natural rewards such as food, water, and 
social interactions with conspecifics trigger the release of 
dopamine in reward circuits (e.g., the striatum). 
Stimulants (e.g., cocaine and amphetamine) also trigger 
the release of dopamine in reward circuits. These and 
related findings encouraged the idea that neuroscientists 
have a successful understanding of addiction. For example, 
Nora Volkow in a talk titled “The Unyielding Power of 
Dopamine” (Volkow, 2017) argued that all drugs cause 
addiction by way of their effects on dopaminergic neurons. 
However, she ignored well-established research showing 
that marijuana, nicotine, and opioids typically have little 
impact on striatal dopamine, yet are addictive. For 
example, in a study with heroin addicts, a 50 mg dose of 
heroin produced a desirable euphoric high but no release in 
dopamine in the striatum (Daglish et al., 2008).  Moreover, 
as is the case for brain studies of addiction in general, the 
evidence for a causal link is missing. For example, rats 
continue to prefer saccharin to cocaine even though 
stimulants have a much greater impact on dopamine than 
saccharin does (Lenoir et al., 2007). 
In a scholarly review of the dopamine brain theory 
of addiction, published recently in Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience, Nutt and his colleagues (2015) cautioned 
their fellow neuroscientists that addiction is a complex 
phenomenon and that brain theories, like all theories, 
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require scrutiny. Put more generally, the article’s point 
was that enthusiasm for brain theories of addiction, and in 
particular those based on dopamine, has greatly outpaced 
research addressing causal relations between the brain 
and addiction. 
The second part of the brain-based account of 
addiction is that addicts are compulsive drug users because 
drugs change the brain (e.g., Leshner, 1999, 2001). 
However, as we show in Sections I and II, this assumption 
is wrong. As research progresses, we will learn much more 
about the role of the brain in addiction, but what we learn 
will not change the well-established facts that addicts 
retain the capacity to choose to stop using drugs. 
B. Rhetorical Functions of the Brain Disease 
Model  
 
Efforts to position addiction as a “brain disease” 
were intended to persuade politicians and society to take 
the problem seriously other than as a moral failure. The 
model’s appeal is obvious: It is tidy. It signifies medical 
gravitas and neuroscientific sophistication.  In practical 
terms, advocates of the brain-disease model hoped that this 
portrayal would inspire insurance companies to expand 
coverage for addiction and politicians to allocate more 
funding for research and treatment (Babor, 1990; Rosen & 
Savory, 2012). Prior to serving as NIDA director, Leshner 
served as acting director of the National Institute of Mental 
Health. There, he saw how brain-disease “branding” could 
prompt Congress to act. “Mental health advocates started 
referring to schizophrenia as a ‘brain disease’ and showing 
brain scans to members of Congress to get them to increase 
funding for research. It really worked,” he said (Leshner, 
2009).  
Several scientists have expressed the opinion that 
re-classifying addiction would help them recruit more 
young scientists into the field. “I think one of the issues 
that has kept scientists from working on this is the same 
[moral] stigma,” says a scientist quoted in a paper by 
psychologist Rachel Hammer of the Mayo Clinic and 
colleagues. “I think if we had a way of making this process 
be thought of as a disease you are going to have a lot more 
scientists willing to roll up their sleeves to work on the 
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problem,” the scientist continues. Thus, Hammer and 
colleagues conclude that “addiction-as-disease was an 
important factor in scientists’ efforts to obtain funding and 
build research teams.” (Hammer et al, 2013).  
Many proponents of the brain-disease concept were 
deeply committed to dispelling the stigma surrounding 
addiction. As Leshner wrote in Science in 1997,”The gulf in 
implications between the ‘bad person’ view and the ‘chronic 
illness sufferer’ view is tremendous.”  Medicalizing the 
condition, they hoped, would rehabilitate the public image 
of addicted individuals, transforming them from 
undisciplined deadbeats to people struggling with an 
ailment. This approach had its roots in the world of mental 
health advocacy. Until the early 1980s, many people 
blamed parents for their children’s serious mental 
problems. Then advocates began to publicize 
neuroscientific discoveries, demonstrating, for example, 
that schizophrenia is associated with abnormalities of 
brain structure and function. (Goldstein & Rosselli, 2003; 
Phelan et al., 2002; Illes et al., 2008; Borgelt et al., 2011; 
Buchman et al., 2013). The science was not as secure as 
advocates for the mentally ill had hoped, but the idea of 
using the same de-stigmatizing strategy for addiction took 
hold. 
 
Many experts credit the brain-disease narrative 
with enhancing the profile of their field. The late Bob 
Schuster, head of NIDA from 1986 to 1991, admitted that 
although he did not think of addiction as a disease, he was 
“happy for it to be conceptualized that way for pragmatic 
reasons… for selling it to Congress” (Schuster, 2007). For 
decades, addiction research had been a low-status field, 
disparaged by other researchers as a soft science that 
studied drunks and junkies. Now the field of neuroscience 
was taking greater notice. “People recognize that certain 
decision makers and others are very impressed with 
molecular biology,” said Robert L. Balster, director of the 
Institute for Drug and Alcohol Studies at Virginia 
Commonwealth University (Balster, 2004).  
Psychiatrist Jerome Jaffe, an eminent figure in the 
field and the first White House adviser on drugs (the 
precursor of the “drug czar”), saw the adoption of the brain-
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disease model as a tactical triumph but a scientific setback. 
“It was a useful way for particular agencies to convince 
Congress to raise the budgets (and) it has been very 
successful,” he said. Indeed, neuroimaging, neurobiological 
research, and medication development consume over half 
of the NIDA research budget. In light of the agency’s reach 
– it funds almost all substance-abuse research in the 
United States – it sets the national agenda regarding 
which research gets funded and therefore the nature of the 
data produced and the kinds of topics that investigators 
propose. But Jaffe argues that the brain-disease paradigm 
presents “a Faustian bargain – the price that one pays is 
that you don’t see all the other factors that interact (in 
addiction)” (Jaffe, 2007).  
C. Conceptual Confusions Associated with the 
Brain Disease Model 
 
This sub-section addresses a number of conceptual 
confusions.  It starts by explaining that brain changes 
associated with persistent seeking and using substances do 
not mean that these behaviors are the signs of a brain 
disease and that such brain changes do not mean that 
persistent seeking and using of substances are involuntary 
actions in the legal sense of the term, “involuntary.” This 
sub-section then shows that the analogy of addiction to 
conditions that are unquestionably diseases is false and 
concludes with a demonstration that although no one 
chooses to be an addict, addicts choose to persistently seek 
and use. 
1. Brain Changes Do Not Necessarily Signify 
Brain Disease   
On the one hand, every experience changes the brain 
– from learning a new language to navigating a new city. 
On the other hand, not all brain changes are equal; 
learning French is not the same as acquiring a crack habit. 
If brain changes signified a disease state per se, however, 
we would all be diseased all the time. In addiction, intense 
activation of certain systems in the brain makes it 
challenging, but by no means impossible, for users to quit, 
but this does not mean that characterizing addiction as a 
brain disease is necessarily the most useful model for 
explanation and treatment.   
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Endowing brain changes with too much clinical 
significance reflects the power of the increasingly 
neurocentric perspective that researchers and the public 
apply to behavioral conditions. Neurocentrism is a term 
coined to describe the view that human behavior can be 
best explained by looking solely or primarily at the brain. 
In an instance of a brain disease, psychotic disorders, and 
some others, the best initial treatments often manipulate 
the brain directly (though medication, mainly). Addiction 
is not such a condition. It is true that replacement opioids 
such as buprenorphine can be stabilizing because they 
prevent withdrawal symptoms and suppress craving, but 
instead of focusing narrowly on neurobiology, as a brain-
disease model implies, there is greater value in viewing 
addiction as a multifaceted behavior that operates on 
several levels at once, including molecular function and 
structure, brain physiology, motivation, personality, the 
psychosocial environment, culture, and social relations. 
The lower levels of explanation, particularly those 
involving the brain, are simply one part of an enormously 
complex causal and clinical story. Indeed, they are not 
necessarily the most informative for most practical 
purposes, such as the prevention and treatment of 
addiction. 
  Over-emphasizing the neural level of analysis when 
conceptualizing addiction impedes our progress in treating 
and preventing it because it distracts us from paying 
needed attention to users’ motives, to their unappreciated 
decision-making capacity, and to their abilities to respond 
to incentives. To be sure, addiction can be partially 
explained according to how it operates at the level of 
neurons and brain circuits. In this respect, arguably, 
addiction is a brain problem. But it is also a personality 
problem, a motivational problem, a social problem, a 
cultural problem, and so on. There is no scientific or clinical 
reason to privilege one level of analysis above all of the 
others unless doing so enhances our ability to respond 
effectively. At every one of those levels, we can find causal 
elements that contribute to excessive and repeated drug 
use and to potential strategies that can help bring the 
behavior under control. 
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In a 2016 article in the New England Journal of 
Medicine, Nora Volkow and others contend that the more 
we understand the neurobiological elements of addiction, 
the more we come to understand that this condition is a 
brain disease (Volkow et al. 2016). But this makes as much 
sense as concluding that because we now know more about 
the role of personality traits, anxiety and impulse control 
deficits in increasing addiction risk, we can, at last, 
recognize that addiction is a disease of personality. This 
contention that neurobiological understanding of a 
behavior entails that the behavior is a disease simply begs 
the question. As Volkow et al. write: 
In the past two decades, research has increasingly 
supported the view that addiction is a disease of the 
brain.… the underlying concept of substance abuse 
as a brain disease continues to be questioned, 
perhaps because the aberrant, impulsive, and 
compulsive behaviors that are characteristic of 
addiction have not been clearly tied to 
neurobiology… (at p. 363)  
The model does not “continue to be questioned” 
because the linkages between addiction and biological 
processes are not obvious enough, however. It is clear and 
wholly expected, that a behavior as dramatic as addiction 
would have neural correlates (Volkow, 2006). Assuming we 
had sufficiently advanced science to identify such 
correlates, the absence of them would represent a profound 
upheaval of everything we know about biology in general 
and neuroscience in particular.  But those linkages show 
only that the brain is involved with drug addiction, much 
as the brain is involved with all discrete behaviors. The 
linkages do not, per se, make the case that addiction is best 
defined as a brain-based phenomenon. Indeed, we fully 
expect more details about the biology of addiction to be 
uncovered in the near future. But that won’t make it any 
more a brain disease than it is now. 
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2. Brain Changes Do Not Per Se Signify 
Involuntariness 
Essentially any experience that changes behavior or 
consciousness must also change the brain. For instance, 
brain-imaging studies report persistent changes in the 
brain as a function of reading a novel (Berns et al., 2013). 
Reading and writing this brief changes the brains of the 
readers and writers. Thus, the question is not whether 
drugs change the brain, but whether they do so in a way 
that renders drug use no longer voluntary.   The primary 
reason to reject this claim is conceptual.  Section II. infra 
reviews the scientific literature. 
Let us begin with meaning of “involuntariness,” 
which can be either literal or metaphoric and normative.  A 
human bodily movement is literally involuntary if it is a 
pure mechanism and not an action at all.  Spasms and 
reflexes are examples.  In criminal law, this is instantiated 
in the “voluntary act” doctrine that is an element of all 
crimes. Metaphorical compulsion exists when the bodily 
movement is an action, but it is done under a situation of 
constraint or hard choice.  Duress is a classic example.  The 
prohibited act a defendant performs in a do-it-or-else 
situation is surely an intentional human action, but if the 
choice is too hard to expect most people not to yield to the 
threat, then we may excuse the agent.  Which choices are 
“too hard” is of course a normative social, moral and 
ultimately legal question.   
Duress involves two parties, but in one party cases, 
such as giving in to a strong desire one knows one should 
not satisfy, it is much harder to assess the level of 
constraint because the subjective variables involved in 
deciding whether sufficient constraint exists are hard to 
assess.  Such considerations led both the American Bar 
Association (1983, 1989) and the American Psychiatric 
Association (1983) to officially recommend the abolition of 
“control” tests for legal insanity.  The test for metaphorical 
involuntariness in one party cases most always rests on a 
behavioral analysis because intentional action is being 
evaluated and there is no proxy measure, whether it is 
psychological or biological, that is available to reliably 
assess the level of constraint in these cases.   
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Despite laboratories all over the world working to 
find an adequate measure of whether a person could not 
control herself, the line between “could not” and simply 
“did not” is still elusive.  There is no such consensually 
accepted measure (Morse, 2002, 2004, 2016, and in press).  
The conclusion that the agent could not control herself is 
typically based on a reverse inference.  If the agent 
continues to engage in the behavior despite negative and 
sometimes disastrous consequences and the agent reports 
that she would like to stop, then we conclude that it must 
be the case that she could not control herself.  But this is 
not a scientific judgment.  It is at best a common sense 
inference, and the question is whether it is correct, a 
question addressed in Section II. 
Addiction is a quintessential case of one-party 
metaphorical involuntariness.  The necessary, 
foundational criteria of addiction—persistent seeking and 
using substances—are unquestionably human actions and 
not mechanisms like spasms or reflexes.  If the agent stops 
persistently seeking and using, as so many addicts do, 
either occasionally or permanently, the agent is not then 
addicted. Moreover, in few cases is the agent forced to use 
drugs by an external threat.  The motivation is entirely 
internal. 
We explained above that all human action has 
biological causes at the level of the brain.  That is simply a 
fact about human beings.  If your brain is dead, then so are 
you and you are not acting.  We also explained that the 
brain is constantly changing in response to various stimuli.  
If changes in the brain signified involuntariness, then all 
human action would qualify as involuntary.  Some 
scientists and even some philosophers think that this is 
true, but it is simply an example of unrefined biological 
determinism that holds that if an action has biological 
roots, as all do, then it must be a mechanism or beyond the 
agent’s control.  This philosophically contestable view—
and it is a minority view among philosophers of mind, 
action, and responsibility— is certainly inconsistent with 
the moral and legal structure of our society that makes the 
morally powerful distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary actions.   
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Once again, whether sufficient constraint exists to 
lead to the conclusion of an action being involuntary in a 
one party case must be assessed behaviorally.  We must 
assess the psychological processes, such as desires, beliefs, 
memory, and judgment, for example, that are implicated in 
all human action, including yielding to untoward desires.  
Neuroscience may eventually help us understand those 
processes better, but simply because addiction seems to be 
associated with certain characteristic brain changes, does 
not per se mean that persistent seeking and using of 
substances is involuntary. 
We typically do not know whether and to what 
degree the differing brain characteristics of addicts and 
non-addicts are the result of addiction itself or pre-existed 
the addiction.  There are also not yet any population-based 
studies large enough to understand the statistical range of 
brain activity and brain anatomy. Consequently, we 
usually do not know if there are brain “changes” or simply 
different brains. It would not be surprising if both were 
true because everything, including the persistent use of 
substances, changes your brain.  But ethical constraints 
prevent us from doing prospective, long-term controlled 
studies on human subjects to answer this question.  Using 
animal subjects sheds some light on the problem, but with 
all due respect, most other animals (especially the rodents 
that are the focus of most neuroscience work on addiction) 
are not creatures like us that act for psychological reasons, 
such as deep-seated angst, profound boredom, or concerns 
about the future, although they may be profoundly 
intelligent in some respects.  An addict acts for these and 
other psychological reasons; an addicted mouse or rat does 
not.  In any case, the existence of brain changes does not 
per se mean the behavior is involuntary. 
  One might claim that, regardless of cause, the 
different characteristics of the “addicted brain” are 
“abnormal” and therefore associated behavior is 
involuntary, but this claim is confused.  We typically 
conclude that the changes in brain are abnormal because 
they are associated with behavior we have decided on other 
grounds is abnormal.  But that just regresses the issue to 
one involving the assessment of behavior.  After all, 
scientifically rigorous neuroscientists do not go on “fishing 
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expeditions.”  They first identify what they believe is a 
well-validated or well-characterized behavioral condition 
that they wish to investigate because the behavior is of 
interest for some reason other than it will have neural 
correlates. Thus, scientists study addiction because they 
have already decided that the behavior is abnormal for 
reasons other than differing anatomy or function.  
However, they presume a priori that the brain is the source 
of the problem and go on to study the anatomy and function 
of the brains of those people who persistently seek and use 
drugs despite the negative consequences of these actions.  
And as explained earlier in this sub-section, there are no 
consensually validated behavioral measures of control 
capacity.  Consequently, the virtually always correlational 
findings of neuroscientific studies of this capacity must be 
approached with genuine caution.  
Also, even if an abnormal variable is causally 
involved in some action, it does not mean the action is 
metaphorically involuntary.  Imagine an armed robber who 
intermittently has episodes of hypomania characterized by 
exceptionally high levels of energy, overconfidence and self-
importance.  He only robs when in a hypomanic episode 
because only then does he feel sufficiently energetic and 
confident enough to engage in such physical, high risk 
behavior.  But for his hypomania, he does not rob.  His 
robbing is surely action and it is surely voluntary.  
Depending on the nature of his psychological state at the 
time of the crime, we might excuse him because he suffered 
from significant rationality impairments, for example, but 
that does not mean his actions were involuntary.  
Moreover, the brain of an individual who has hypomania 
surely instantiates certain brain states that differ from the 
brains of those without this condition. Even abnormal 
brain changes do not per se mean that persistent seeking 
and using substances are involuntary. 
Everything we say about whether brain changes 
associated with addiction per se prove the involuntariness 
of persistent seeking and using of drugs also applies to the 
genetic bases for addiction (Morse, 2011, 2014).  Twin and 
adoption studies have repeatedly demonstrated a genetic 
predisposition for alcoholism (e.g., Cloninger, 1987), and 
the limited amount of research on the genetics of illicit 
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drug use suggests the same for drugs such as heroin, 
cocaine and marijuana (Tsuang et al., 2001). Excepting 
such variables as linguistic accent and choice of religious 
affiliation, all individual differences in behavior are partly 
attributable to differences in genes, however, including 
voluntary acts. The brain is the biological organ that is 
necessary for choice, and brain structure and development 
follow the blueprint set by DNA. Thus, there is no 
necessary connection between heritability and 
involuntariness. In support of this point, monozygotic 
twins are much more likely to share similar religious and 
political beliefs than are dizygotic twins, even when they 
grow up in different homes and were separated before the 
age of one year (e.g., McCourt et al., 1999; Waller et al., 
1990).   
These beliefs, like all mental states and actions, 
have genetic underpinnings but they are not necessarily 
involuntary. The relevance to addiction is that a genetic 
predisposition is not a deterministic cause of involuntary 
behavior, just as drug-induced brain changes are not. If the 
genetic basis for a behavior were a condition that negated 
responsibility, no one would be responsible for any 
behavior (Morse, 2011).   We agree that some brain 
alterations are associated with psychological states that 
can make it more challenging for addicts to make certain 
choices, but Section II demonstrates that those changes do 
not come close to eradicating the capacity to refrain from 
persistent seeking and using substances. 
Finally, we question the assumption that the 
symptoms of addiction were ever officially designated as 
“uncontrollable.” This is an important matter given the 
charge that the probationer has been subject to “cruel and 
unusual punishment” because she was expected by the 
court to modify a behavior (drug taking) that is 
intrinsically beyond modification. An examination of DSM-
5 is highly relevant here and it offers no support for the 
assumption that SUD symptoms are “uncontrollable.”  
 
According to the Manual, a person can meet criteria 
for severe SUD if she meets criteria that fall under four 
organizing categories. The category most relevant to the 
matter at issue is called “impaired control.” Among the 
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criteria that count as impaired control, according to DSM-
5, are “wanting to cut back on problematic use but being 
unable to do so” or “using much more of the substance than 
originally intended.” These are ambiguous criteria. What 
does it mean to be “unable” to do something? How do we 
distinguish between an act that is truly irresistible and one 
in which an urge to act is simply not resisted although the 
agent could do so? Brain scans are of no use here. And the 
ample evidence on contingency management show that 
addicts are indeed capable of resistance – whether they 
exercise that capacity is another matter. Similarly, what 
does it mean to persist in an activity when we don’t want 
to? We often do something longer than intended (e.g., a 
Boston-based professor taking a moment to see how the 
Red Sox are doing when preparing a lecture; staying at the 
office longer than promised; hanging out with friends 
rather than mowing the lawn, etc.) and relapse may 
equally well indicate ambivalence rather than “lack of 
control.” These interpretations comport more faithfully 
with what we know about how and why addicts quit drugs 
than the idea that addicts continue to use because, thanks 
to brain changes, they cannot do otherwise. It is worth 
noting that after 1980, the DSM architects adopted an 
“atheoretical” approach to formulating diagnostic criteria. 
The idea was to keep definitions strictly descriptive and not 
comment upon whether symptoms are modifiable.  
   
3. Comparisons with Conventional Brain 
Diseases Are Flawed 
 
What’s more, addiction is a condition whose 
symptoms (persistent drug use despite negative sequelae) 
can be coerced or incentivized to cease.  True, one might 
coerce or incentivize a diabetic to observe his diet and take 
medication regularly, activities which will likely result in 
improved glucose control, but one is not coercing or 
incentivizing the underlying mechanism.   After all, you 
cannot tame insulin dysregulation, the underlying 
pathology, with contingencies.  
 
Granted, some patients with diabetes, hypertension, 
and asthma will experience exacerbation of their 
conditions despite having followed instructions faithfully 
(some autonomous physiological disruption clearly is at 
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work), but addiction is not a condition that worsens 
independent of the behavior of the addicted person. 
Conversely, if the user follows expert advice – “do not use 
drugs” – she no longer has the “disease” of addiction. This 
is because, again, addiction is defined by signs and 
symptoms alone. The addiction itself – that is, persistent 
drug use despite negative consequences – is not diagnosed 
by brain changes: the behavior is the disease. In other 
words, observable drug taking constitutes the disease state, 
it does not manifest it.  Addiction is not a latent entity 
(alterations in brain function) that causes observable 
manifestations (drug use); rather it is the observable 
manifestation. 
 
4. No One Chooses to Become an Addict, but 
They Choose Nonetheless To Use 
 
The paradox at the heart of addiction is this: How 
can the capacity for choice coexist with self-
destructiveness? “I’ve never come across a single person 
that was addicted that wanted to be addicted,” says 
neuroscientist Nora Volkow (Gugliotta, 2003). One could 
say the same of an obese person: how many of us have ever 
come across a heavy person who exercised his or her 
freedom expressly toward the goal of becoming fat? Many 
undesirable outcomes in life arrive incrementally. 
 
But if addiction is a choice, why would anyone 
“choose” to engage in such a self-destructive set of 
behaviors? People don’t choose to use addictive drugs 
because they want to be addicted. People choose to take 
addictive substances because they want immediate relief, 
or in some cases to seek out novel psychological or 
physiological sensations.  
Let’s follow a typical trajectory. At the start of an 
episode of addiction, the drug increases in enjoyment value 
while once-rewarding activities such as relationships, job 
or family recede in value. Although the appeal of using 
starts to fade as negative consequences pile up – spending 
too much money, disappointing loved ones, attracting 
suspicion at work – the drug still retains value because it 
salves psychic pain, suppresses withdrawal symptoms and 
douses intense craving. The brain disease model cannot 
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accommodate the fact that people use drugs and continue 
to use them for reasons. 
The idea that no one wants to become an addict leads 
to the much-promoted false dichotomy captured in a 
statement by the former Surgeon General, Vivek Murthy. 
In a 2016 report on addiction, the Surgeon General 
presents a choice: “It’s time to change how we view 
addiction,” he writes, suggesting that addiction is solely a 
brain disease (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Office of the Surgeon General, 2016). True, 
addiction per se is not a character flaw, but neither is it an 
involuntary process, which is precisely what “hijacked” 
neurobiology and “brain disease” imply. But we should be 
able to create a vibrant middle ground in which we both 
recognize the choice-making capacities in addiction and 
leverage them to therapeutic ends while advancing public 
investment in humane care (Heather, 2017). 
D. There Is No Evidence That the Brain 
Disease Model Meaningfully Reduces the 
Stigma Associated With Addiction 
 
A robust literature indicates that biological 
explanations of behavior do not produce some of the 
responses that brain disease advocates had hoped for. For 
example, they appear to foster pessimism about the 
likelihood of recovery and the effectiveness of treatment 
(Schomerus et al., 2012). This finding may seem 
counterintuitive. One might think that a biological 
explanation would be good news to a patient – and to be 
sure, some people with mental illness do indeed find it a 
relief. But when the patient’s affliction is addiction and 
there are no medical cures to restore an addict’s disrupted 
brain, emphasizing the biological dimension seems 
misguided. We offer just two examples of a more extensive 
literature on the effect of framing behavior as mediated 
solely by biological processes. 
 
Rachel Hammer and colleagues conducted in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews with 63 patients in treatment 
for addiction in alcohol and/or nicotine treatment centers 
in the US Midwest and with 20 addiction scientists of 
various kinds (Hammer et al., 2013). Interviewees were 
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asked about their understanding of addiction, including 
whether they considered it to be a disease. The authors’ 
conclusion from these data was that, despite popular 
arguments that framing addiction as a disease will 
improve treatment outcomes and decrease moral stigma, 
such a framing is not only unnecessary, but may be 
harmful. They observe: “Rather than a malady of the weak-
willed, addiction reframed as a pathology of the weak-
brained (or weak-gened) bears just as much potential for 
wielding stigma and creating marginalized populations.” 
(p. 28)  
 
Kvaale and colleagues (Kvaale et al., 2013) carried 
out the first meta-analytic review of studies looking at the 
effects on stigma of biogenetic explanations of mental 
disorders, including substance use disorders. Samples 
included in the review consisted of lay people, 
professionals, and individuals themselves affected by 
psychological problems. The main finding was that 
biogenetic explanations did appear to reduce blame but 
also induced pessimism over the future prospects of those 
suffering from these disorders. It was also found that 
biogenetic explanations increased endorsement of the 
stereotype that people with psychological problems are 
dangerous, an understandable reaction to the idea that 
addiction, for example, is the result of permanent changes 
to brain mechanisms over which the sufferer has no 
control. 
 
II.  ADDICTS RETAIN THE CAPACITY TO 
CHOOSE TO REFRAIN AND DO RESPOND 
TO INCENTIVES AND REASONS 
In the hands of those who subscribe to and promote 
the brain-disease model, brain imaging is often intended as 
a visual refutation of the existence of the addict’s capacity 
to refrain from using substances.    In a typical imaging 
experiment conducted with positron emission tomography 
(PET) or functional magnetic resonance imagining (fMRI), 
addicts watch videos of people handling a crack pipe or 
needle, causing their prefrontal cortices, amygdala, and 
other brain structures to activate beyond the base rate of 
activity in the region of interest (the entire brain is active 
all the time) (Goldstein & Volkow, 2002). Videos of neutral 
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content, such as landscapes, induce no such heightened 
response while the brains of comparison subjects presented 
these stimuli are being scanned. The resultant technicolor 
images of affected brain regions, which are simply graphic 
representations of complex mathematical data and are not 
“pictures” of the brain, are undeniably arresting.   These 
images are meant to convince us that the mere will to 
change or choice in the face of rewards or punishment 
cannot be expected to override these tissue or physiological 
changes. After all, it appears that one can “see” the damage 
inflicted on the now allegedly “broken” brain. 
 But seeking and using drugs can be affected by the 
will and does respond to incentives, as this Section will 
demonstrate. As psychologists and philosophers have 
underscored, and as we explained above, the common 
interpretation of pathological behavior as involuntary is 
often informed by a primitive form of biological 
determinism. If biological roots can be found, then we 
reflexively think “disease,” and assume that its signs, like 
seeking and using substances, are not actions but pure 
mechanisms.  Addiction may narrow addicts’ focus and 
reduce their ability to take pleasure in non-drug 
experiences, but it does not turn them into automatons or 
slaves to their desires.  They remain agents who can and 
do react to a variety of sanctions and incentives. 
 
 The data show that individuals who meet the 
American Psychiatric Association’s criteria for “substance 
use disorder” (the technical term for “addiction”) stop using 
drugs as a function of the factors that influence choices for 
all people, such as economic concerns, legal concerns, 
family issues, and moral values. To help put this conclusion 
into context, these same factors do not affect the symptoms 
of cancer, schizophrenia, or even diabetes, a disease with 
significant behavioral aspects. That is, drug use in addicts 
differs from the symptoms of widely recognized diseases.  
But first, consider a few of the basic features of addiction.  
 As we explained previously, addictive drugs act on the 
brain, producing virtually instantaneous changes in 
psychological state that often include intense feelings of 
pleasure, freedom from worry, and peace. However, with 
continued use, the strength of the immediate pleasurable 
drug effects decrease and negative effects begin to 
 22 
 
accumulate. Direct negative drug effects include tolerance 
and withdrawal, and indirect negative effects include 
socially mediated problems, such as fear of arrest, possible 
job loss, problems with family members, and the host of 
issues that accompany illegal or frowned upon activities. 
Although this is a highly simplified, abbreviated account, 
it yields clear predictions regarding the course of addictive 
drug use given the assumption that addicts retain the 
capacity to choose not to use drugs.  
(1) We should expect an initial, positive “honeymoon 
period” of escalating drug use.   
(2) Then, there should be a period of ambivalent drug 
use, for example, addicts will quit using then start up 
again, then quit using, etc.  (Indeed, many experts think 
that ambivalence is an almost invariant feature of 
addiction.) 
(3) Finally, drug use ends.   
 
  The costs and benefits of drug use vary from 
individual-to-individual, and alternatives to drugs vary 
across individuals.  Consequently, we should expect large 
individual differences in how long each stage of addiction 
lasts. Notice that this account differs markedly from the 
claim that addiction is usually, let alone invariably, a 
chronic, relapsing disease.  
 
Recall that the idea that addiction is a disease is 
based in large part on studies of addicts in treatment (e.g., 
McLellan et al. 2000; O’Brien & McLellan, 1996). However, 
it is widely acknowledged that since most addicts do not 
seek help from clinics, clinic-based research may provide a 
biased account of addiction (e.g., Robins, 1993). To avoid 
these biases, researchers organized large, nation-wide 
epidemiological studies that recruited participants 
scientifically. For instance, the subject pools numbered in 
the thousands and matched the demographic 
characteristics of the nation as a whole (see Robins & 
Regier, 1991 and Heyman, 2009 for the historical 
background of these ground-breaking epidemiological 
studies). Some participants had been in treatment but this 
was not a necessary criterion. To date, four major surveys 
have been published (Anthony & Helzer, 1991; Conway et 
al., 2006; Kessler et al., 2005; Stinson et al., 2005; Warner 
et al., 1995). 
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  The basic findings include the following: Most of those 
who were addicted to illegal drugs stopped using by about 
age 30. Addiction to legal, more readily available, drugs 
(e.g., alcohol and cigarettes) persisted considerably longer 
than dependence on illegal drugs (e.g., cocaine). Most 
addicts quit using without professional medical or 
psychological assistance  For instance at about age 42, 
between 75% and 83% of those addicted to opiates, cocaine, 
and marijuana no longer met the criteria for addiction. In 
support of this result, a study that carefully tracked the 
time course of addiction revealed that the asymptotic 
remission rates were higher than 90% for illegal drugs 
(Lopez-Quintero et al., 2011). Importantly, the high rates 
at which addicts quit drugs was not an artifact of high 
mortality rates or other methodological issues (Heyman, 
2013). 
 
 Most addicts quit and do so on their own.  Addiction 
seems to be among the most spontaneously “remitting” of 
all the conditions termed major mental disorders, which is 
a very inconvenient fact for the position that addiction is a 
“chronic and relapsing brain disease.”  Consequently, it is 
reasonable to speculate that quitting was due to the 
gradual accumulation of the negative effects of drug use, 
particularly those related to the responsibilities that often 
accompany early and middle adulthood. A large body of 
research supports this line of thinking. 
 
 In interviews and memoirs, addicts identify both 
practical and moral reasons for quitting drugs.  The 
following paraphrased quotes are typical: “I wasn’t raised 
to be a bad parent,” “I wanted my parents to be proud of 
me,” “I was too old to go back to jail,” “I could no longer 
afford drugs and groceries,” “I knew I would die if I didn’t 
stop,” “I wasn’t born in order to become a drug addict.” In 
a study of heroin addicts, Waldorf (1983) quantified the 
explanations for quitting. In order of most frequent to least 
frequent, they were: “It was time to do other things,” “Had 
no alternative,” “Fears of loss of significant others,” “Fears 
of returning to prison,” “Concerns for health.”  
 
 Another type of evidence is based on the changing 
history of the legal status of drugs and on changes in the 
widespread understanding of their health effects.  During 
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the 20th century, there have been several nation-wide 
changes in the legal status of addictive drugs and in the 
understanding of their health risks. These events have 
many of the features of scientific experiments, but we do 
not have to wonder whether the results apply outside of the 
lab. In the late 19th and early 20th century, opiates and 
other addictive drugs were legal and could be purchased at 
pharmacies and mail-order companies (e.g., Sears, 
Roebuck and Company). The Harrison Act of 1914 
outlawed the non-medical use of opiates and cocaine. The 
result, according to historians and early monographs from 
the 1920s (Courtwright, 2009; Kolb & DuMez, 1981), was 
an approximately 50% decrease in opiate addiction.  
 
 The Volstead Act, popularly known as Prohibition 
(1920), was followed by a marked increase in the price of 
alcohol and a concomitant decrease in alcoholism, as 
indexed by abrupt decreases in the rates of cirrhosis of the 
liver (Miron & Zweibel, 1991; Seeley, 1960). Since heavy 
drinking is a prerequisite for cirrhosis, the decrease in 
cirrhosis rates suggests that Prohibition must have 
brought about a decrease in alcoholism. These facts and 
their implications have been overshadowed by the 
unpopularity of Prohibition and the gradual return of 
widespread heavy drinking in the late 1920s.  
 
 For much of the early and mid-20th century, tobacco 
companies successfully undermined research that 
demonstrated a connection between smoking and cancer. 
However, in 1964 the Surgeon General published a well-
documented, strongly worded rebuttal that convinced 
much of the public that smoking entailed severe health 
risks including an increase in the likelihood of cancer. The 
report was followed immediately by a striking, 
approximately linear decrease in the prevalence of 
smoking, despite the fact that most smokers who quit were 
pack-a-day addicted smokers (USDHHS, 1990, 1964; see 
Heyman, 2013 for graphs of these results).  
  
 The historical trends are exactly as expected if addicts 
retain the capacity to quit drugs. In contrast, new laws, 
increases in prices, and newly published scientific 
information do not slow down the growth of cancer cells, 
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restore the capacity to remember in Alzheimer’s patients, 
or restore a receptor’s affinity for insulin. 
 
 Data from interventions that focus explicitly on the 
determinants of choosing to continue or desist from drug 
use are also supportive of the view that addicts can be 
affected by incentives and reasons. Steve Higgins, a 
psychologist at the University of Vermont, developed an 
addiction treatment program based on the ideas that 
addicts would choose to stop using drugs if there was a 
concrete and relatively immediate reason to do so and that 
they would remain abstinent if they became involved in 
rewarding, new nondrug activities. The initial trials were 
with cocaine addicts. If a drug test was negative, the client 
earned a voucher for goods and services, such as 
educational programs, and recreational activities. 
Conversely, a positive urine test reduced the value of the 
voucher. One control group received counseling but no 
contingency, and a second control group got vouchers 
independent of whether they had been abstinent. All 
subjects met the then DSM criteria for cocaine addiction.  
 
 At every test date, the contingency group had higher 
abstinence scores (Higgins et al., 1994, 1995). A surprising 
feature of this success is that the vouchers were never 
worth more than $12.50. This amount is likely less than 
the client had been spending on cocaine. Yet, they chose the 
voucher instead.  This finding persisted at follow-up and 
has been replicated.  If cocaine addicts are stubbornly 
compulsive, then once the immediate reward for abstinence 
is gone, they should start using cocaine again. However, at 
every follow-up date, voucher subjects were more likely to 
have drug-free urines. Most interestingly, the percentage 
of drug-free samples increased from about 60% to almost 
80% for the voucher group. 
 
 The subjects in the Vermont study were treatment 
seekers, who presumably wanted to change. Would 
contingencies work on drug addicts who did not volunteer 
to seek help? Physicians and airplane pilots who are on 
probation for drug use provide a handy test of this 
question. The physicians and pilots were compelled to 
enter treatment and forced to make themselves available 
for random testing. If they tested positive, they risked 
 26 
 
permanently losing their license to practice and the income 
and status associated with such prestigious professions. 
Given how much was at stake for the lives of these subjects, 
they had very strong reasons to cease using and they did. 
The abstinence rates were typically above 80% and 
averaged close to 90% (Coombs, 1997, graphs in Heyman, 
2009).    
 
 It is reasonable to suppose that such high abstinence 
rates reflect the individual characteristics correlated with 
the responsibilities and skills involved in medicine and 
piloting an airplane. However, a similar program with men 
and women on probation in the criminal justice system 
obtained similar results.  Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation 
with Enforcement (HOPE) program is an innovative 
approach to the problem of high rates of drug use among 
men and women in prison (Hawken & Kleiman, 2009). The 
program focuses on the post-release probation period, with 
the aim of breaking the vicious correlation between drug 
use and recidivism. The terms of parole include a contract 
to abstain from illegal drugs. To ensure that the 
probationers maintained their end of the bargain, they 
were subject to random drug tests. Positive tests resulted 
in a few days back in jail. The key finding was that drug 
use decreased by more than 80% within the first three 
months of the contingency plan and by more than 90% at 
six months (Hawken & Kleiman, 2009). A control group 
composed of probationers who were not under threat of 
immediate consequences for drug use continued to use 
drugs at the same rate as at the start of their probation. 
  
  The intervention results tell the same story as the 
epidemiological research, self-reports by addicts, and the 
historical record: addicts can choose to stop using drugs; 
they retain the capacity to quit. In contrast, the 
interventions that help addicts to quit drugs would not 
alleviate the symptoms of diseases that defenders of the 
disease model say addiction is similar to (e.g., McLellan et 
al., 2000; O’Brien & McLellan, 1996). No one could 
reasonably suppose that rewards persuade tumors to 
shrink. But rewards persuade addicts to reduce drug use.  
 
  Many other studies also confirm that addicts respond 
to incentives. Here are a few excellent further examples.  A 
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classic demonstration of the power of incentives was the 
military’s Operation Golden Flow (Gupta, 2015). In 
Vietnam, between ten and twenty-five percent of GI’s were 
addicted to high-grade, freely-available heroin.  In 1971, 
President Nixon commanded the military to begin drug 
testing. No soldier could board a plane home until he had 
passed a urine test. As word of the new directive spread, 
most GIs stopped using narcotics, and almost all soldiers 
who were detained passed the test on their second try.  
Once they were home, heroin apparently lost its appeal 
(Robins et al., 1974). Opiates may have helped them endure 
the war’s alternating bouts of boredom and terror, but 
stateside, civilian life took precedence. Only five percent of 
the men who became addicted in Vietnam relapsed within 
ten months after return, and just twelve relapsed briefly 
within three years. 
Consider the following fMRI experiment by 
researchers at Yale and Columbia. They found that the 
brains of smokers reporting a strong desire to smoke 
displayed enhanced activation of reward circuitry, as 
would be expected (Westbrook et al., 2011). But they also 
suggested that subjects could reduce craving by 
considering the long-term consequences of smoking, such 
as cancer or emphysema, while observing videos depicting 
people smoking. When subjects did so, their brains 
displayed enhanced activity in areas of the prefrontal 
cortex associated with focusing, shifting attention, and 
controlling emotions. Simultaneously, activity in regions 
associated with reward, such as the ventral striatum, 
decreased (Kober et al., 2010).  
Investigators at NIDA observed the same pattern 
when they asked cocaine users to inhibit their craving in 
response to cues. Subjects underwent positron emission 
tomography (PET) scanning as they watched a video of 
people preparing drug paraphernalia and smoking crack 
cocaine. When researchers instructed the addicts to control 
their responses to the video, they observed inhibition of 
activity in brain regions normally associated with drug 
craving. When not deliberately suppressing their cravings, 
the addicts reported feeling their typical desire to use, and 
the PET scans revealed enhanced activation in brain 
regions that appear to be implicated in craving (Volkow et 
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al. 2010). We use the word, “appear,” advisedly.  Recall that 
for methodological reasons, most such studies indicate only 
association (correlation), and conclusive inferences about 
causation are unwarranted. 
These powerful findings illuminate the capacity for 
self-control in addicts. They also underscore the idea that 
addicts persist not because of an inability to control the 
desire to use, but from a failure of motivation. Granted, 
summoning sustained motivation can be a great challenge. 
It takes a lot of energy and vigilance to resist persistent 
craving. Studies on the regulation of craving also help to 
distinguish behavior that people simply do not control from 
behavior that they cannot control. We are again referring 
to the elusive line between “did not” and “cannot.” Imagine, 
by way of contrast with the behavior of addicts, promising 
a reward to people with Alzheimer’s if they could keep their 
dementia from worsening. That would be both pointless 
and cruel because the kinds of brain changes intrinsic to 
dementia leave the sufferer largely resistant to rewards or 
penalties. In short, contingencies cannot produce recovery 
or full remission of these conditions as it can in individuals 
addicted to drugs. 
Finally, we close this Part with reference to Powell 
v. Texas, 292 U.S. 514 (1968).  It is emblematic of our core 
argument.  Powell, was a chronic alcoholic who spent all 
his money on wine and who had been frequently arrested 
and convicted for public drunkenness.  In the present case, 
Mr. Powell argued that he was afflicted with "the disease 
of chronic alcoholism,...his appearance in public [while 
drunk] was not of his own volition," (p. 517) it was “part of 
the pattern of his disease and is occasioned by a compulsion 
symptomatic of the disease,” and thus to punish him for 
this behavior would be a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 
This is an extremely sympathetic case for a compulsion 
excuse.  The crime was not serious and the criminal 
behavior, public intoxication, was a typical manifestation 
of Powell’s alcoholism (he had been arrested for public 
drunkenness over one hundred times). 
 
The Supreme Court rejected Mr. Powell’s claim for 
many reasons.  Among them, Justice Marshall’s plurality 
opinion was skeptical of the compulsion claim and 
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concluded that it went too far on the basis of too little 
knowledge.  (As Part III. discusses further, we think the 
same is evidently true for the probationer’s claim.)  It 
pointed to the uncertainty about the meaning of the 
concept of “compulsion.” (Likewise.)  Finally, the opinion 
also suggested that it was unclear that providing a defense 
in such cases would improve the condition of alcoholics. 
(Likewise.) 
  
Powell himself testified about his undisputed 
chronic alcoholism.  He also testified that he could not stop 
drinking.  Powell's cross-examination concerning the 
events of the day of his trial is worth quoting in full, as 
Justice Marshall did. 
Q: You took that one [drink] at eight o'clock [a.m.] 
because you wanted to drink? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: And you knew that if you drank it, you could keep 
on drinking and get drunk? 
A: Well, I was supposed to be here on trial, and I 
didn't take but that one drink. 
Q: You knew you had to be here this afternoon, but 
this morning you took one drink and then you knew 
that you couldn't afford to drink anymore and come 
to court; is that right? 
A: Yes, sir, that's right. 
Q: Because you knew what you would do if you kept 
drinking, that you would finally pass out or be 
picked up? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: And you didn't want that to happen to you today? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Not today? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: So you only had one drink today? 
A: Yes, sir (pp. 519-520). 
On redirect examination, Powell's attorney elicited further 
explanation. 
Q: Leroy, isn't the real reason why you just had one 
drink today because you just had enough money to 
buy one drink? 
A: Well, that was just give to me. 
Q: In other words, you didn't have any money with 
which you could buy drinks yourself? 
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A: No, sir, that was give to me. 
Q: And that's really what controlled the amount you 
drank this morning, isn't it? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Leroy, when you start drinking, do you have any 
control over how many drinks you can take? 
A: No, sir (p. 520). 
  
Powell wanted to drink and had that first drink, but 
despite that last answer, his compulsion did not cause him 
to engage in the myriad lawful and unlawful means he 
might easily have used to obtain more alcohol if his craving 
was desperately compulsive.  Although Powell was a core 
case of an addict, he could refrain from using if he had a 
good enough reason to do so.   
 
  In sum, although drugs change the brain and 
addiction has a biological basis, research shows that drug 
use in addicts remains voluntary; like other choices it is 
subject to economic, social, and legal sanctions, such as 
those imposed by the courts. 
 
III. THIS CASE HAS PROFOUND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE IMPLICATIONS AND SHOULD 
NOT BE DECIDED ON THE BASIS OF 
CONTESTED CONCEPTS AND SCIENCE. 
 
  This Section addresses, first, some of the potentially 
profound legal and social policy implications of granting 
the probationer’s claim. It then turns to why caution 
mandates that this Court should not accept the claim 
 
A. The Criminal Justice Implications of 
Granting the Claim. 
 
  The basis of the probationer’s claim is that she cannot 
fairly be expected to refrain from using drugs as a condition 
of probation because she cannot control her drug use and 
therefore is not responsible for it.  If the basis for this non-
responsibility claim were firmly established, it would state 
a strong moral and legal claim. It is far from firmly 
established, however, as we believe we have shown in the 
previous sections.  Nonetheless, we consider the 
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implications of the view that the addict is not responsible 
for her use of drugs. 
 
  Let us begin with the effect on probation and parole.  
Staying drug-free is a universal condition of criminal 
justice supervision.  Not only is possession of controlled 
substances a crime in itself in all jurisdictions (see, e.g., 
M.G.L. Part I, Title 15, Chapter 94c, §34), it is well-known 
that for many reasons, including feeding their habit, 
addicts often commit other crimes related to the addiction.  
If addicts cannot be sanctioned for violating this condition 
of probation and parole, the state will lose this powerful 
contingency management technique for assisting addicts to 
remain free of drugs and for protecting society.  The threat 
of being incarcerated or re-incarcerated or sanctioned in 
some way gives the addict an extremely powerful incentive 
to stay clean.  It will not always be successful, but as the 
Hawaii program described in Part II indicates, it decreases 
the rate of violations markedly, an outcome the elasticity 
of demand for addictive substances predicts.  NIDA’s 
funding of contingency management indicates that there is 
consensual understanding that such tools are profoundly 
positive intervention to reduce persistent seeking and 
using of substances. The existence of a specialty Adult 
Drug Court in Massachusetts also testifies to belief that 
imposing the condition of staying clean is efficacious. 
 
  What would be the effect of losing this tool on 
sentencing judges and parole authorities?  The inability to 
impose sanctions will almost certainly increase recidivism 
substantially.  Many judges and parole authorities who are 
conscious of their duty to protect society would hesitate 
before granting probation or parole that might otherwise 
give people a chance to live a productive life in freedom.  In 
an age in which our society is criticized for too much 
incarceration, this would be an unfortunate outcome.  
Paradoxically, if judges no longer granted probation or 
parole and incarceration took its place, this might serve as 
a deterrent to possession because the “cost” of this crime 
would increase, but we doubt it.  In any case, arguing 
against probation or parole without the condition of staying 
drug-free (and, indirectly for incarceration as a deterrent) 
would be an odd position for supporters of the probationer 
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to take because their argument in her favor currently rests 
on the claim, in effect, that addicts cannot be deterred.   
Diversion programs would be imperiled, if not 
crippled. Various types of diversion programs for non-
violent crimes, including specialty drug or mental health 
courts, depend for their success on the contingency 
management tool of making staying clean a condition of 
successfully completing the program with all the benefits 
that accrue. If the probationer’s petition is granted, it 
entails that virtually no diverted addict could succeed.  The 
rationale for these worthy programs would evaporate. 
   Can the effect of holding that probationers are not 
responsible for violating the condition of drug abstinence 
be limited to the context of probation and parole?  There is 
no principled argument for so cabining the holding.  If a 
jurisdiction deems addicts not responsible for possession—
which is a proxy for use—then the state will lose its power 
to use the criminal sanction as one powerful regulatory tool 
in its armamentarium.  If an addict cannot control herself 
and is “compelled” to possess in order to use, how can it be 
fair to blame and punish her?  Many jurisdictions 
legislatively preclude using addiction as the basis of an 
insanity defense. As Powell and Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 
735 (2006) respectively teach, no jurisdiction is 
constitutionally compelled to include addiction as a basis 
for legal insanity or to adopt a “control” test for legal 
insanity.  Massachusetts has such a test.  Granting this 
petition, which entails adopting the contested disease 
model of addiction and the corollary that addicts are 
incapable of conforming to the law, will ensure that 
addiction will now be used to support the claim that an 
addicted defendant charged with illegal possession should 
be acquitted by reason of insanity. Such claims and the 
adjudication of whether the defendant is truly an addict 
will multiply. 
The result will not be positive for addicts.  As this 
Court wrote in Commonwealth v. Bruneau, 472. Mass. 510 
(2015), 
 “… a defendant found not guilty by reason of mental 
illness faces harsh consequences because the 
defendant is eligible for civil commitment under 
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strict security, where he would be confined for an 
indefinite period of time. See G. L. c. 123, § 16.”(at 
pp. 517-18) 
Under such a threat, addicts will probably not be willing to 
raise the defense of legal insanity because the 
consequences of conviction will be much less harsh than a 
successful insanity acquittal.  After all, potentially life-long 
commitment, a practice the Supreme Court approved in 
Jones v. United States, 463 US 354 (1963), a case involving 
a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity for shoplifting, 
will deter raising legal insanity.  In the case of acquittals, 
the state will inevitably exercise its power for the purpose 
of preventive detention.  This will simply confirm Justice 
Marshall’s prediction in Powell that the effect of imposing 
a “compulsion” defense would result in incarceration. The 
only thing that would change is the name of the institution 
from jail to hospital.  If the probationer’s petition is 
granted, the insanity defense might be well-justified by the 
same reasoning, but defendants will be unwilling to use it.  
 It is by no means clear that a complete defense to crime 
for addicts could be limited to the offense of illegal 
possession.  The most extensive discussion of this issue in 
case law is United States v. Moore, 486 F. 2d 1139 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973).  Moore was an addict convicted of possession 
who claimed on the basis of uncontested expert evidence at 
trial that addiction was a disease and that he could not 
control his compulsion to possess and to use.  The trial 
judge refused to grant Moore an instruction providing a 
defense to possession on that basis. The D.C. Circuit 
affirmed the conviction.  There were numerous detailed 
concurrences in this result, but it was so held essentially 
for the following reasons:  1) there was controversy over 
whether addiction is a disease and whether we are able to  
know an addict’s genuine capacity to refrain from using; 2) 
the defense would apply to any defendant with impaired 
behavioral controls, even in the absence of an allegedly 
objective cause such as a disease; 3) it would apply not only 
to possession, but also to any other crimes committed to 
support the addiction; and, 4) adopting such a defense 
would undermine the strong public policy supporting the 
prohibition of sale and possession of controlled substances. 
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  There were two very strong dissents. The first, by 
Judge Skelly Wright, argued that the common law should 
embrace a new principle according to which a drug addict 
who lacks substantial capacity to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of the law as a result of drug use should 
not be held criminally responsible for mere possession for 
his own use.  The opinion rejected the claim that deterrence 
would be undermined as too speculative.  This dissent 
recognized that the compulsion claim might be difficult to 
limit to mere possession, but evaded the problem by 
arguing that Congress clearly intended that such a defense 
should not go this far. (The majority thought this argument 
was scant consolation.)  In a second, partial dissent, the 
chief judge of the circuit, David Bazelon, argued that the 
principle behind adopting the defense applied to crimes 
other than mere possession and that juries should also 
hear evidence about compulsion arising from addiction 
when other crimes were charged, including armed robbery 
or trafficking. 
 
  The arguments in Moore are strikingly similar to 
those in this case.  And recall that the claim in Powell 
involved public drunkenness, a claim distinct from 
possession, because that criminal behavior was allegedly 
part of the pattern of and a compulsion symptomatic of the 
disease of alcoholism (we recognize that possessing alcohol 
is not a crime, but the claim is analogous).    
 
It might be argued that this case should adopt the 
disease and non-responsibility claims because these have 
now become firmly established.  Sections I. and II. of this 
brief deny this, but granting the petition will cast the 
doctrines of criminal responsibility of addicts for many 
crimes  into dangerous, uncharted waters.  Moreover, the 
thinking behind these claims, which often rests on what we 
have termed “unrefined biological determinism,” will 
support claims that the very concept of responsibility that 
is foundational for criminal law and our society is 
unjustified. We are mindful of the dangers of catastrophic 
thinking, but we fear that granting the probationer’s 
petition may have the effect of starting to pry open the lid 
of Pandora’s Box.  
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  Another implication of granting the probationer’s 
petition concerns civil commitment specifically aimed at 
addicts who are dangerous to themselves or others.  
Massachusetts has such a law (M.G.L., Chapter 132, 
Section 35).  Although not criminal, such laws serve at 
least one goal in common with criminal law: incapacitation 
of potentially dangerous people. The primary purpose of 
such laws is to provide treatment, not to punish the people 
committed. If convicted defendants cannot be required to 
remain clean, these laws might be used in place of 
probation.  Nevertheless, these laws do not provide the 
same level of due process protection as criminal law; it is 
not clear that the benefits intended occur; and they can 
have quite disquieting unintended consequences, such as 
housing in jails, rather than in treatment facilities, the 
people who have been committed (Depew et al, 2014).  
Granting the petition in this case and thus announcing 
that addicts who are potentially dangerous cannot be 
deterred by sanctions may well increase the use of this 
unfortunate approach to addiction, especially because the 
definition of dangerousness is so vague.  In Jones, for 
example, the Supreme Court suggested that shoplifting a 
jacket was a sufficiently dangerous crime to justify 
potentially life-long involuntary civil commitment after 
acquittal by reason of insanity (at p. 365, n. 14).  Justice 
Marshall’s prediction of turning hospitals into jails would 
once more be confirmed.  Granting the petition will not be 
of benefit to addicts in the long run. 
 
 B. The Need for Caution 
We urge this Court to be cautious.  As Justice 
Marshall wrote about the similar claim being made in 
Powell, “The difficulty with that position [that Powell 
should be excused because his crime was allegedly part of 
the pattern of and a compulsion symptomatic of the disease 
of alcoholism], is that it goes much too far on the basis of 
too little knowledge.” (at p. 521).  As Parts I. and II. have 
demonstrated, this is still true despite claims to the 
contrary. 
 It may be true that the majority of addiction specialists 
– but not necessarily premier scholars in psychiatry, 
psychology, or allied fields - adhere to the monolithic brain 
 36 
 
disease model and believe that addicts cannot control the 
action of using drugs.  Nonetheless, psychiatry and 
psychology are imperfect, constantly evolving fields.  They 
do not control what the law may properly do.  Their 
classifications and concepts have purposes that differ from 
the law’s. The United States Supreme Court said this in 
Powell (at p. 526) and has repeatedly re-affirmed since, e.g., 
Jones at 365, n.13; Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 414 
(2002); Clark at 752-53, 774-75.  The American Psychiatric 
Association concurs. The “Cautionary Statement for 
Forensic Use” in DSM-5 states the following.  
Although the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria and text are 
primarily designed to assist clinicians in conducting 
clinical assessment, case formulation, and 
treatment planning, DSM-5 is also used as a 
reference for the courts and attorneys in assessing 
the forensic consequences of mental disorders. As a 
result, it is important to note that the definition of 
mental disorder included in DSM-5 was developed to 
meet the needs of clinicians, public health 
professionals, and research investigators rather 
than all of the technical needs of the courts and legal 
professionals (at p.25). 
In Powell, Justice Marshall recognized that there 
was serious difficulty understanding the meaning of 
compulsion (at p. 526)  As the contrasting majority and 
dissenting opinions in Crane disclose, there is continuing 
debate about the meaning of “serious difficulty” controlling 
one’s behavior and similar terms, such as compulsion or 
loss of control, and about whether control capacity can be 
reliably assessed.    Justice Breyer’s majority opinion wrote 
that,  
…we recognize that in cases where lack of control is 
at issue, "inability to control behavior" will not be 
demonstrable with mathematical precision. It is 
enough to say that there must be proof of serious 
difficulty in controlling behavior (at p. 413). 
In a rather colorful passage, Justice Scalia’s dissent had 
the following to say on this question. 
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This formulation of the new requirement [serious 
difficulty controlling behavior] certainly displays an 
elegant subtlety of mind….How is one to frame for a 
jury the degree of "inability to control…?  Will it be 
a percentage ("Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you 
may commit Mr. Crane  under the SVPA [referring 
to Kansas’ law governing the commitment of so-
called mentally abnormal sexually violent 
predators] only if you find, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that he is 42% unable to control his penchant 
for sexual violence")?  Or a frequency ratio ("Ladies 
and gentlemen of the jury, you may commit …only if 
you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is 
unable to control his penchant for sexual violence 3 
times out of 10")? Or merely an adverb ("Ladies and 
gentlemen of the jury, you may commit Mr. Crane 
under the SVPA only if you find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that he is appreciably—or 
moderately, or substantially, or almost totally—
unable to control his penchant for sexual violence")? 
None of these seems to me satisfactory (at pp.423-
24). 
DSM-5’s “Cautionary Statement” is also instructive about 
control problems. 
Nonclinical decision makers should also be 
cautioned that a diagnosis does not carry any 
necessary implications regarding the etiology or 
causes of the individual's mental disorder or the 
individual's degree of control over behaviors that 
may be associated with the disorder. Even when 
diminished control over one's behavior is a feature of 
the disorder, having the diagnosis in itself does not 
demonstrate that a particular individual is (or was) 
unable to control his or her behavior at a particular 
time (at p. 25) 
The preceding sections of this brief indicate that debates 
about the conceptualization and measurement of “loss of 
control” continue. 
As the majority concluded in Clark,  
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Though we certainly do not "condemn mental-
disease evidence wholesale" [citation omitted], the 
consequence of this professional ferment [concerning 
psychiatric classification and its implications] is a 
general caution in treating psychological 
classifications as predicates for excusing otherwise 
criminal conduct (at p. 775). 
The history of psychiatry and psychology is littered with 
discredited paradigms and beliefs that were once 
considered orthodoxy or were “generally accepted.”  We 
urge this Court to be cautious and not to grant this petition 
because doing so will implicitly accept highly contested and 
evolving concepts and science as a basis for a legal policy 
that could have the profoundly negative consequences for 
addicts, the criminal justice system and for society 
discussed just above.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
  This case raises important questions about principles 
of behavior, criminal responsibility, and the sound and fair 
administration of criminal justice. The probationer claims 
that she should not be held accountable for her failure to 
“remain drug free” as a condition of her probation because 
she suffers from addiction, or substance use disorder 
[SUD], wherein her continued use of substances despite 
negative consequences is a sign of that disorder. Her claim 
is flawed in a number of ways.  As a straightforward matter 
of definition, we note that nowhere in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric 
Association, the most widely used taxonomy of psychiatric 
disorders, is drug use in the context of SUD regarded as a 
behavior completely beyond the control of the addicted 
user. More substantively, the core of her argument, which 
depends largely on the implications of the brain-disease 
model of addiction -- namely, that the brain changes 
associated with addiction render the addict incapable of 
behavioral control – is demonstrably untrue.  The mere 
association of drug taking with expected neurobiological 
changes in the brain is not evidence that drug use is beyond 
control. This is abundantly evident from the large volume 
of data demonstrating that addiction is a set of behaviors 
whose course can be altered by foreseeable consequences. 
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The same cannot be said of conventional brain diseases 
such as Alzheimer’s or multiple sclerosis.  
In sum, the best scientific and clinical data are 
strongly at odds with the view that addicts are unable to 
choose not to use substances. We believe that a decision in 
favor of the probationer could have significant, even 
devastating, implications for the future of treatment-based 
approaches to criminal justice as well as for criminal 
responsibility more generally. We conclude that the 
probationer’s claim should be denied because it is based on 
erroneous, refuted scientific premises and will have 
negative consequences if it is accepted.    
Respectfully submitted, 
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